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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The following parties to this proceeding are also parties in this appeal:
1.

Chris Ann Mellor Williams, in her capacity as birth parent and

guardian for Hayden Williams (deceased); and
2.

Wasatch Crest Insurance Company in Liquidation.

The following party to this proceeding is not a party in this appeal:
3.

Wasatch Crest Insurance Company.

The following are parties to this proceeding solely by virtue of the
administrative consolidation of two liquidation proceedings, but they have no
interest in this appeal:
4.

Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company; and

5.

Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company in Liquidation.

The following is not a party to this appeal, but was part of the proceedings that
resulted in the first decision by this Court in this case, Mellor v. Wasatch Crest
Mut Ins. Co., 2009 UT5, \ 20, 201 P.3d 1004:
6.

The Utah Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association.
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Lennard W. Stillman (the Liquidator), in his capacity as the court-appointed
Special Deputy Liquidator of Respondent and Appellee Wasatch Crest Insurance
Company in Liquidation (the Liquidation Estate or WCICIL), respectfully submits
this brief in response to the Opening Brief of Appellant Chris Aim Mellor (Mellor).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Mellor asserts this Court's jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3102(3)(j) (2002) and UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a). Opening Brief (OB) at 4. She ignores
the jurisdictional issues raised in the Liquidation Estate's Motion to Dismiss
Appeal and supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, filed on January
21,2011.
By Order entered on March 30, 2011, the Court deferred ailing on the
motion for summary dismissal until plenary presentation on the merits. The Court
further ruled that, as to the arguments concerning jurisdiction, "the parties may
choose to rest on the pleadings they have submitted or may address the matter as
they see fit in briefing and/or at argument." The Liquidation Estate relies on the
arguments stated in its Motion to Dismiss Appeal and below.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Does this Court lack jurisdiction to decide Mellor's appeal because

the November 1, 2010 district court order denying Mellor's summary judgment
motion and reaffirming the stay entered in the Liquidation Order is not a final and
1

appealable judgment and there is no basis for Mellor to pursue an interlocutory
appeal?
2.

Assuming jurisdiction, arguendo, is Mellor's present attempt to

challenge the Liquidator's June 29, 2010 denial of her claim barred because she
failed to file an objection to that determination within sixty days, as required by
Section 31 A-27-332(l)(b)(i) of the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act,
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§31A-27-101 - 31A-27-342 (2002, repealed 2007) (the

Liquidation Act)?1
3.

Assuming jurisdiction and ignoring Mellor's failure to timely object

to the June 29, 2010 denial of her claim, did the Liquidator correctly conclude that
Mellor was fully indemnified by Medicaid and is therefore excluded from Class
Three under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(iii) (2000, repealed 2007)?

In 2007 the legislature repealed the Liquidation Act and enacted the Insurer
Receivership Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§31 A-27a-101 - 31 A-27a-902 (2007). The
newer Receivership Act is not applicable to "a delinquency proceeding ongoing on
April 30, 2007." Id at § 31 A-27a-l 19. Therefore, the older Liquidation Act
applies to this proceeding, which was pending as of April 30, 2007.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A,

Nature of the Case.

This appeal arises out of the liquidation of Wasatch Crest Insurance
Company (Wasatch Crest) under the Liquidation Act. On June 29, 2010, the
Liquidator issued a notice of determination denying Mellor's claim against the
estate in liquidation. Mellor did not file any objection to that determination in the
district court. Instead, Mellor appealed to this Court from a district court order that
denied a summary judgment motion Mellor had filed before the Liquidator's
determination of her claim.
The Liquidation Act sets forth precise and mandatory procedures for claims
against the liquidation estate. The Act does not permit a claimant like Mellor to
pursue a claim through a "summary judgment" motion, and it requires a claimant
to file a timely objection to the liquidator's claim determination. The statute is
unambiguous regarding the effect of a failure to file a timely objection - the
Liquidator's determination becomes final. In addition, Utah law limits this Court's
jurisdiction to final orders. Finally, the Liquidation Act is clear that claims subject
to indemnification from other sources are excluded from Class Three payment
priority. Because Medicaid has already fully paid for the medical services covered
by Mellor's claim - and Mellor neither paid nor owes money for those services -

3

the Liquidator correctly determined that Mellor does not have a Class Three claim
for losses incurred under a Wasatch Crest policy.
In this appeal, Mellor asks the Court to ignore its lack of jurisdiction, her
failure to comply with the Liquidation Act's mandatory procedural requirements,
and the Act's unambiguous classification provisions.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Mellor's Fourth District Lawsuit. In March 2003, about five months
before the Utah Insurance Commissioner placed Wasatch Crest into liquidation,
Mellor filed suit against Wasatch Crest and other defendants in Mellor v. Wasatch
Crest Mutual Insurance Co., Civil No. 030401281 (4th Jud. Dist.) (the Fourth
<-y

District Lawsuit). R. 3614-3684. In the Fourth District Lawsuit, Mellor asserted
tort and contract claims against Wasatch Crest based on Wasatch Crest's
termination of coverage and failure to pay for medical services provided to her
minor son, Hay den Williams, after a near-drowning accident on August 4, 2001.
Id.
sy

Among the additional defendants in the Fourth District Lawsuit was Wasatch
Crest Mutual Insurance Company (Mutual), which is a separate entity that never
provided coverage to Mellor. Mutual was separately placed into liquidation on
July 31, 2003, in Civil No. 030915528 (3d Jud. Dist, Timothy R. Hanson, J.), R.
1-12, and an Amended Order of Liquidation with a Finding of Insolvency was
entered on August 11, 2003. R. 100-01. On July 31, 2003, the separate liquidation
proceedings against Wasatch Crest and Mutual were consolidated for
administrative purposes only. R. 82-83.
4

The liquidation proceeding. On July 11, 2003, the Utah Insurance
Commissioner filed a petition to place Wasatch Crest into liquidation (Liquidation
Petition). See R. 143-144. On July 31, 2003, Wasatch Crest was placed into
liquidation as WCICIL, in Civil No. 030915528 (3d Jud. Dist, Timothy R.
Hanson, J.) (the Liquidation Order). R. 143-154. The Liquidation Order stayed all
pending proceedings against Wasatch Crest under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-317
(2002, repealed 2007). The Order also directed all pending and prospective claims
against Wasatch Crest to be presented as claims against the Liquidation Estate, as
required by the Liquidation Act. R. 153, f 18. On August 11, 2003, an Amended
Order of Liquidation was entered with a Finding of Insolvency. R. 155-156.
On November 5,2003, Mellor filed a Proof of Claim against the Liquidation
Estate for payment of the policy benefits she had sought against Wasatch Crest in
the Fourth District Lawsuit. R. 5583-5584. The Fourth District Lawsuit remained
stayed until February 5, 2007, when it was dismissed without prejudice based on
Mellor's counsel's statement that "the liquidation action of Wasatch Crest must be
addressed in the Third District, where the liquidation was filed." Docket Sheet,
Fourth District Lawsuit, provided as Attachment A to this brief.

This Court may take judicial notice of the docket in the Fourth District Lawsuit.
See, e.g., Billings v. Toscano, 2010 UT App 389 (unpublished), 2010 WL 5550456
at*ln.5.
5

The Initial and Amended Notices of Determination. On October 12,
2005, the Liquidator issued a Notice of Determination (Initial NOD), which denied
Mellor's claim based on the Liquidator's belief that the claim was being
administered by the Utah Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association
(ULHIGA). R.4610. Mellor filed a timely objection to the Initial NOD. R. 30233025. On December 19,2005, the Liquidator issued an Amended Notice of
Determination (Amended NOD), which denied Mellor's claim on the merits.
R. 3043. The Liquidator concluded that Hay den "was not eligible for coverage
under a Wasatch Crest Insurance Company policy due to his being eligible for
Medicaid as of August 1, 2001 [,]" and due to the Wasatch Crest coverage having
"terminated on July 31, 2001." Id. Because both the Wasatch Crest termination
date and the Medicaid start date preceded August 4, 2001, the date of Hay den's
accident, the Liquidator concluded that the Liquidation Estate could not be liable
for Wasatch Crest's failure to pay Hay den's medical benefits.
On February 14,2006, Mellor objected to the Amended NOD. R. 31283351. The denial of coverage in the Amended NOD was submitted to a courtappointed referee who agreed with the Liquidator on August 2, 2006. R. 39573962. On August 18,2006, Mellor objected to the Referee's Findings of Fact and
Recommendation. R. 4497-4610. On August 6, 2007, the district court approved
the Referee's Findings of Fact and Recommendation. R. 4939-4942.
6

The first appeal Mellor appealed the district court's decision to this Court.
R. 4963-4964. In a decision filed January 27, 2009, the Court concluded that "the
terms of the Wasatch Crest plan did not operate to terminate Hay den's coverage as
a matter of law when Hay den became eligible for Medicaid coverage." Mellor v.
Wasatch CrestMut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, \ 20, 201 P.3d 1004 {Mellor I). See also
id. atffif11-21. However, the Court did not order payment of the claim, nor did it
address either the priority (class) or amount of the claim - issues that neither the
Liquidator nor the district court had reached (in light of their determinations of
non-coverage). Also holding that Mellor has standing to bring a claim in the
liquidation proceeding on behalf of her minor son, the Court ultimately permitted
Mellor to "pursue an action for recovery of benefits owing to Hay den under the
plan." Id. a t ! 2 1 .
Mellor's summary judgment motion. This appeal concerns events that
occurred after the first appeal. In Mellor I, by allowing Mellor to "pursue . . .
benefits," the Court implicitly ordered the Liquidator to reconsider Mellor's claim.
Under the Liquidation Act, the statutory proof of claim process is the exclusive
means to prosecute a claim against the Liquidation Estate. Consequently, only the
Liquidator could determine in the first instance whether Mellor's claim would be
allowed, and if so, how the claim should be classified. However, in January 2010,
before the Liquidator had issued a new determination, Mellor filed papers in the
7

liquidation proceeding styled as a "motion for summary judgment." Mellor sought
an order requiring the Liquidation Estate to reimburse Medicaid for expenses
Medicaid had paid from August 1, 2001 through July 31,2003. R. 5143-5325.
The Liquidator moved to dismiss the "summary judgment motion" as an
improper filing in a liquidation proceeding. The Liquidator's filings explained that
under the Liquidation Act, there is no "complaint," "answer," or provision for
summary judgment motions to be filed in the district court. Rather, the statutory
claim process is the exclusive avenue for prosecution of claims against a
liquidation estate under the Liquidation Act. R. 5565-5567, 5642-5645.
Alternatively, the Liquidator moved to stay the summary judgment motion until he
could issue an amended determination of the claim. R. 5564-5565, 5644-45. In
the further alternative, the Liquidator argued against summary judgment on the
merits for two reasons. First, because Medicaid had paid all of Hay den's bills,
Medicaid is the real party in interest. As a non-policyholder, Medicaid could not
assert a claim under the Wasatch Crest policy. Second, even assuming that Mellor
had the claim, it could not be a Class Three claim as her summary judgment
motion assumed, because Medicaid had fully indemnified Mellor for all her losses
by paying for all of Hay den's medical care. At best, the Liquidator contended,
Mellor might have a Class Six claim. R. 5576-5580, 5642-5650.

8

The Second Amended Notice of Determination. On June 29,2010, while
Mellor's summary judgment motion was pending, the Liquidator issued his Second
Amended Notice of Determination (Second Amended NOD). R. 5653. The
Liquidator again denied Mellor's claim on the merits, concluding that she had
suffered no unreimbursed loss under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(iii)
(2000, repealed 2007) (defining Class Three claims), because she had been fully
indemnified by a third party, Medicaid.
The district court's order. On November 1, 2010, the district court issued
the order from which Mellor purports to currently appeal. R. 5702-5708. In dicta,
the court addressed the merits of the parties' respective arguments, concluding that
Mellor is a Class Six, not Class Three, claimant because Medicaid paid for
Hayden's medical expenses. R. 5707-5708. Ultimately, the court denied Mellor's
summary judgment motion and reaffirmed the stay entered in the Liquidation
Order. R. 5708. This appeal followed. R. 5714-5715.
C.

Statement of Facts.

In addition to the procedural events outlined above, the following facts are
pertinent to determination of this appeal.
On August 4,2001, when Hayden's accident occurred, he was insured under
a Wasatch Crest policy provided to Hayden's father through his employment,
which Hayden's father elected to continue after his termination from employment,
9

under the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985.
R. 5049, % 2. Wasatch Crest accepted premium payments on that policy through
November 7, 2001. Mellor I, 2009 UT 5, \ 2.
Mellor applied for Medicaid coverage for Hay den two weeks after the
accident. Id, f 3. When Medicaid approved the application in September 2001, it
backdated Hay den's effective coverage date to August 1, 2001, to ensure Medicaid
coverage for Hay den's past and future medical expenses arising from the accident.
Id.
Wasatch Crest continued to pay for Hay den's medical expenses until
November 2001, when it asserted that its coverage ended once the Medicaid
coverage began on August 1, 2001. Id, f 4. Wasatch Crest asked Hay den's
providers to return amounts paid to them by Wasatch Crest and to instead obtain
Medicaid's payment for those services. Id. Most of the providers complied with
that request. Id.
The Utah State Office of Recovery Services (ORS) is the state agency
charged with the responsibility to administer Utah's Medicaid program. On
October 3, 2002, ORS entered into a Collection Agreement with Mellor. R. 46444647. The Collection Agreement authorized Mellor to include in her civil case
against Wasatch Crest - the not-yet-filed Fourth District Lawsuit - a claim by ORS
for reimbursement of Medicaid amounts paid to Hay den. R. 4644.
10

On September 7, 2006, ORS filed a Notice of Representation of Medicaid
Claim (Notice of Representation) in the W O O L liquidation proceeding. R. 46414647. The Notice of Representation asserted that the Collection Agreement
allowed ORS's claim for reimbursement of Medicaid benefits to be included in
Mellor's claim against the Liquidation Estate. R. 4641. The Liquidator's
September 13,2006 Response to the Notice of Representation expressly advised
Mellor, Medicaid, and the ORS that "the ORS has not filed a claim in the
liquidation estate as is required of any claimant or third party who seeks payment
from the insolvent estate, and does not have a direct claim against the estate."
R. 4661; see also R. 4662-4663.
Neither ORS nor Medicaid ever filed a claim on its own behalf in the
liquidation proceeding.
For the Court's prior summary of most of these facts in Mellor i, see 2009
UT5,1fl[2-4.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The common thread in this case is Mellor's disregard for the controlling
Utah statutes, rules, and case law:
1.

Under clear court rules and well-established case law, this Court lacks

appellate jurisdiction over the district court's non-final Memorandum Decision and
Order. An order denying a motion for summary judgment and confirming the
11

existence of a stay is not a final judgment. Mellor agrees that there is no legal
authority for filing this appeal on an interlocutory basis. The Court should reject
her argument, unsupported by law, that she may leap-frog the procedures mandated
under the Liquidation Act, because waiting to appeal until she has a final judgment
"would simply waste time and resources."
2.

Under the unambiguous language of the Liquidation Act, UTAH CODE

ANN. § 31 A-27-332(l) (2002, repealed 2007), Mellor was required to object to the
Liquidator's denial of her claim within sixty days of the Second Amended NOD.
She failed to do so. As a consequence, (a) the Second Amended NOD became
final on August 29, 2010, the sixty-first day after the Liquidator's determination;
(b) the district court and this Court lack authority to review that determination on
its merits; and (c) Mellor is permanently foreclosed from attacking that
determination. This Court should therefore reject all of Mellor's arguments
challenging the Second Amended NOD.
3.
CODE ANN.

Under another unambiguous provision of the Liquidation Act, UTAH
§§ 31A-27-335(2)(c)(iii) (2000, repealed 2007), Mellor's claim is

excluded from Class Three because Medicaid has indemnified her in full for her
loss. Mellor's attempts to evade the statute's plain language lack merit. Mellor's
claim is not a claim under a Wasatch Crest policy because she had no coverage as
of the date the liquidation took effect and she had no filed-but-unresolved claims
12

for benefits as of that date. Mellor's coverage had ended and Wasatch Crest had
rejected her claims almost two years earlier; therefore, her claim against the
Liquidation Estate arose exclusively out of her inchoate claims in the Fourth
District Lawsuit, which are non-policyholder creditor claims and fall outside the
scope of Class Three. Nor is Mellor prosecuting a claim of a governmental entity
under a Wasatch Crest policy - neither ORS nor Medicaid filed a proof of claim
against the Liquidation Estate. Finally, the indemnification exclusion from Class
Three is unambiguous and plainly applies here because Medicaid paid all of
Hay den's medical expenses. The Liquidation Act expressly prohibits Mellor's
equitable arguments against application of the indemnification exclusion in this
case, and the equities do not favor Mellor. It is fair, and consistent with the
purposes underlying the Liquidation Act, to exclude from Class Three the claim of
a fully-indemnified former policyholder, so that more assets of the Liquidation
Estate are available to compensate policyholders and competing creditor claimants
as of the liquidation date.
In truth, no inequities flow from the Second Amended NOD, denying
Mellor's claim. Mellor is not out-of-pocket one cent — she owes nothing to
Hay den's medical providers. Hay den's medical providers have all been paid.
Medicaid chose not to protect its interest in reimbursement by filing a claim
against the Liquidation Estate. The true real party in interest appears to be
13

Mellor's attorneys, whose contingent attorneys' fees will be paid based on the
amount Mellor recovers on her claim, and who seek to circumvent the statutory
distribution schedule. On the other side of the equation, the Liquidator has a
fiduciary duty to determine and pay competing claims in accordance with the
Liquidation Act. In this case, the claim was denied for failure to satisfy the Act's
substantive and procedural requirements. On these facts, even if the purported
"equities" were relevant - they are not - the Liquidator reached the fair and correct
determination.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ERROR.

Mellor has not complied with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5),
which requires an appellant's brief to state for each issue "the standard of appellate
review with supporting authority," and either "citation to the record showing that
the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking
review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Based on Mellor's failure to
meet these requirements, this Court would be justified in "declining] to address
any of [her] arguments." MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1998). See
also UTAH R. APP. P. 24(k) ("Briefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or strickenf.]"); Beehive Tel Co, v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah,
2004 UT 18,ffif12-16, 89 P.3d 131 ("Compliance [with the Rules of Appellate
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Procedure concerning briefing] is mandatory and failure to conform to these
requirements may carry serious consequences.").
This Court's determination of its own jurisdiction, including whether a
district court decision is final, is a question of law. Anderson v. Wilshire
Investments, Z.L.C, 2005 UT 59, % 7, 123 P.3d 393. '"[M]atters of statutory
construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness.'" Hill v. Estate
of Alfred, 2009 UT 28, f 36, 216 P.3d 929 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
II.

THIS COURT LACKS APPELLATE JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE ORDER ON
APPEAL I S NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT.

On January 21, 2011, the Liquidation Estate filed its Motion to Dismiss
Appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. On March 31, 2011, after briefing, this
Court entered its Order deferring the jurisdictional dispute until plenary
presentation on the merits. The Liquidation Estate incorporates in this brief all
arguments made in its January 21, 2011 Memorandum of Points atnd Authorities in
support of dismissal.
A,

Under Bedrock Law, the November 1,2010 Order Is Not a Final
Judgment.

With the exception of certain interlocutory appeals (which Mellor does not
purport to pursue here), this Court's jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final
orders and judgments. Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, f 9, 5 P.3d 649. The
15

Court has "strictly adhered to [the final judgment] rule because limiting appeals to
final judgments preserves scarce judicial resources . . . [and] also maintains 'the
proper relationship between this Court and the trial courts.55' Powell v. Cannon,
2008 UT 19, f 12, 179 P.3d 799 (citing, inter alia, Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97,
f 11,37 P.3d 1070; Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, \ 11).
The district court's November 1, 2010 Order from which Mellor appeals is
not final for two independent reasons. First, the order confirms a stay, which is
not a final judgment. The district court's separate ruling related to the priority of
Mellor5 s claim is dictum because it was not essential to the dispositive ruling that
Mellor5 s claim is stayed. Second, even if the order could possibly be read as
denying Mellor5 s summary judgment motion on its merits, an order denying
summary judgment is not a final judgment.
An order confirming a stay "neither end[s] the controversy between the
litigants nor dispose[s] of the subject matter of the litigation.55 Powell, 2008
UT 19, f 18 (dismissing appeal from an order compelling arbitration and staying
litigation, based on lack of appellate jurisdiction); Cade v. Zions First Nat'I Bank,
956 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Utah App. 1998). Here, the November 1, 2010 order did not
end the controversy between Mellor and the Liquidator. Nor did it decide Mellor5 s
claim on the merits. The district court held only that Mellor5s claim against the
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Liquidation Estate must be pursued in accordance with the Liquidation Act.
R. 5708. Thus, the order was not a final judgment.
An order denying summary judgment is "strictly a pretrial order/'
Switzerland Cheese Ass % Inc. v. E. Home's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966),
not a final order. See also Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359,
1360 (Utah 1977) (dismissing appeal from denial of summary judgment "because
it is not a final order"). The November 1,2010 order denied Mellor's
(procedurally improper) summary judgment motion because the Liquidation Order
and Act precluded consideration of her claim except as part of the liquidation
proceeding, R. 5708, i.e., after Mellor filed a timely objection to the Liquidator's
Second Amended NOD. As an order that merely denied summary judgment, it is
not a final and appealable judgment.
Although the district court discussed some of the issues raised in Mellor's
summary judgment motion, those comments were dicta because they were "not
essential to the resolution of the issue in the case." Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Emery Cty., 702 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah 1985). This Court does not have jurisdiction
to review dicta. Salt Lake Cty. Comm 'n v. Salt Lake Cty. Atty., 1999 UT 73, f 25
n.9, 985 P.2d 899 ("Because the trial court's hypothetical discussion is dicta and of
no precedential value, we have no occasion to pass on its legal correctness.").
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B.

Mellor's Finality Arguments Lack Merit.

The Liquidator presented the above-cited authority and more in his January
21, 2011 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of dismissal, which he
incorporates into this brief. In response, Mellor did not challenge any of the
finality principles discussed above, nor did she offer any legal authority to support
her premature appeal. Instead, Mellor argued that the November 1,2010 order is a
final judgment because the district court's dicta resolves the ultimate issue in this
case, namely, the correct classification of Mellor's claim, and "[t]here is simply
nothing left for the district court to decide." See Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, at 5 (March 25,2011)
(Mellor's Points and Authorities).
The November 1, 2010 order made clear that the district court was not
finally determining Mellor's claim against the Liquidation Estate. The court noted
the issuance of the Second Amended NOD and Mellor's "option of challenging the
latest Notice of Determination" within the liquidation proceeding.4 R. 5706. And
the court made clear that it was not issuing a decision on the merits of Mellor's
claim but, instead, merely "grant[ed] WCICIL's Motion to Stay because when the
Court declared Wasatch Crest insolvent, it stayed further proceedings in the

4

In fact, though not mentioned in the order, by that time Mellor had failed to
timely object to the Second Amended NOD. See infra at 21-26.
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underlying lawsuit." R. 5708. Accordingly, contrary to Mellor's characterization
of the November 1, 2010 order, it did not fully resolve Mellor's claim.
Mellor offered a second justification for her premature appeal: that she grew
tired of waiting for issuance of the Second Amended NOD after Mellor 7, and her
impatience somehow imbued this Court with jurisdiction. See Mellor's Points and
Authorities at 3 (asserting that Mellor sought summary judgment because "[a]t no
time[after Mellor 7] did the Liquidator put in place a time frame or process to
promptly and fairly resolve Mellor's claim"). But that response is a non-sequitur
because it attempts to justify only Mellor's procedurally improper summary
judgment motion, not her premature appeal.
Equally important, Mellor errs in assuming that the Liquidator was dragging
his feet on her claim after remand. To the contrary, he was working to resolve
important issues - classification and amount of Mellor's claim - that were not
addressed in the Amended NOD. Significantly, he learned new information once
the claim was remanded - that is, Medicaid had paid all of Hay den's medical
expenses. R. 5146, ^f 17, 5577. Upon remand, the Liquidator devoted time and
energy to confirming the extent of Medicaid's indemnification and to settlement
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discussions with Mellor's counsel. See, e.g., Exs. A-C to Affidavit of Brian S,
King (March 25, 2011) (King Aff.), attached to Mellor's Points and Authorities.5
Even if Mellor's frustration with the speed of redetermination after remand
were legitimate - which it is not - there is no "impatience" exception to the final
judgment doctrine. Mellor has posited that the Liquidator was "unreasonable" in
asserting that Mellor needed to follow the Liquidation Act's procedures. Mellor's
Points and Authorities at 8. She argues that the Liquidator's supposedly
unreasonable conduct "should excuse any procedural irregularities" in her
premature appeal. Id. But that is not the law.
Mellor seems to believe that she may simply do whatever she thinks is most
efficient in the circumstances, without regard to the procedures mandated in the
Liquidation Act or the law that generally limits this Court's jurisdiction to review
of final judgments. This Court should correct her misimpression by dismissing this
premature appeal based on lack of appellate jurisdiction.

5

In arguing for appellate jurisdiction, Mellor and her counsel have confused the
separate identities of the Liquidation Estate and the ULHIGA. See King Aff. at
^flf 2-10. ULHIGA is an association authorized by statute to protect persons against
failure in the performance of contractual obligation under a life, accident or health
insurance policy. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-28-102 (2001). With respect to the
Liquidation Estate, ULHIGA is only a creditor. Id, § 31A-28-114(3)(a). It is not
authorized to act on behalf of WCICIL or its Liquidator. Mellor's counsel also
mistakenly believes that WCICIL and/or the Liquidator are governed by a "board".
King Aff. atfflf7-8. The Liquidator is a court-appointed officer of the district court
and there is no governing board.
20

in.

MELLOR MAY NOT CHALLENGE THE LIQUIDATOR'S DENIAL OF HER
CLAIM BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO FILE THE REQUIRED OBJECTION TO THE
SECOND AMENDED NOD.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-27-332Q) (2002, repealed 2007) provides in full:

(l)(a) When a claim is disallowed in whole or in part by
the liquidator, written notice of the determination and of
the right to object shall be given promptly to the claimant
or the claimant's attorney of record, if any, by first-class
mail at the addresses shown in the proof of claim.
(b)(i) Within 60 days from the mailing of the notice
required by Subsection (l)(a), the claimant may file
objections with the court.
(ii) If objections are not filed within the period provided
in Subsection (l)(b)(i), the claimant may not further
object to the determination.
(Emphasis added.) The statute explicitly requires a claimant to object to a
liquidator's disallowance of a claim, by filing an objection with the district court
within 60 days from the date the liquidator mailed the notice of determination.
Subsection l(b)(ii) unambiguously states that a claimant's failure to file an
objection with the district court within that 60-day period precludes the claimant
from "further object[ing] to the determination." These provisions, read together,
are mandatory: a failure to timely object precludes the claimant from challenging
the determination.6

6

The Liquidation Act does not permit the district court to extend the 60-day
deadline for filing objections. Compare In re General Determination of Rights to
21

In this case, the Liquidator served his Second Amended NOD, denying
Mellor's claim, on June 29, 2010. R. 5653. The Second Amended NOD expressly
advised Mellor of the objection requirement, the sixty-day deadline for filing her
objection, and the consequences of a failure to do so:
If you disagree with the Liquidator's determination of
your claim either in full or in part you have the right to
object to the determination of your claim. To object to
the determination you must file a written objection
carrying the heading, In Re Wasatch Crest Insurance
Company in Liquidation, Judge Toomey, Civil Case No.
030915527, Third Judicial District Court, 450 South
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, within sixty days
from the date of this notice. You must also send a copy
of the objection to the Liquidator at the address on this
letterhead. If you fail to file a written objection with the
Court and with the Liquidator, within the specified time,
you will have waived your right to object and the
Liquidator's determination will stand and you will have
no further right of appeal.
Id. (bolded text in original; italics added).

the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106,ffif33-39, 110 P.3d 666 (construing UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-4-10 (1989) as permitting a retroactive extension of time for filing
objections to the state engineer's proposed determination of water rights in a
general adjudication, but only because that statute expressly permits the district
court to extend the deadline for objections).
Although the claimant's and her attorney's actual knowledge has no bearing on
the statutory requirement of a timely objection, it is worth noting that Mellor and
her counsel undeniably did understand the requirement to file a timely objection
under the Liquidation Act. Mellor followed that procedure in 2006, after the
earlier determination of her claim. R. 4497-4610.
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Accordingly, under the Liquidation Act, Mellor was required to file an
objection in the district court before August 28, 2010. She did not comply with the
statute. To this day, Mellor has not filed an objection to the Second Amended
NOD. The result of that failure, under the statute and as expressly confirmed in
Second Amended NOD, is that "the Liquidator's determination. .. stand[s]" and
Mellor "ha[s] no further right of appeal." R. 5653. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A27-332(l)(b)(2) (2002, repealed 2007). In other words, the Second Amended
NOD is a final decision, which Mellor may not challenge.
The district court's October 29, 2010 order does not address the
consequences of Mellor's failure to object to the Second Amended NOD. Instead,
it notes in passing that Mellor had not had an opportunity to object to that
determination. R. 5706. That statement is incorrect. Mellor had the entire 60 days
provided by statute to file an objection to the Second Amended NOD, but she
failed to do so.
Mellor's statement that the Second Amended NOD "was never formally
served on Mellor or her counsel," OB at 13, f 46, is also inaccurate. The
Liquidation Estate attached the Second Amended NOD to its reply brief supporting
dismissal of Mellor's summary judgment motion, which was served by first class
mail on Mellor's attorney of record, and thus on Mellor herself, as required by the
statute. R. 5651.
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Appellate courts are not limited to the district court's bases for decision.
Rather, this Court may rule "based on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record.55 Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, \ 31, 171 P.3d 442 (quoting
State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65,1f 19, 147 p - 3 d 448, and Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT
58, % 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, if the Court
exercises jurisdiction over this appeal, it should hold that Mellor may not pursue
her current attacks on the Second Amended NOD because she did not file a timely
objection with the district court. Statutory requirements for judicial review must
be followed. Litigants may not use collateral procedures to evade statutory
prerequisites to district and appellate court jurisdiction.
For example, in Commercial Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678 (Utah
1982), a circuit court denied the plaintiff banks5 request for contractual interest
rates on certain judgments. Instead of filing an appeal from that inferior court
decision to the district court, as required by Utah statutes and the Utah
Constitution, plaintiffs petitioned for mandamus in the district court. The district
court reached the issue on the merits and ruled against the banks. This Court
affirmed, but on the distinct basis that "mandamus is not available as a substitute
for an appeal[,]55 and, therefore, "plaintiffs did not have the option of substituting
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus55 for the remedy of an appeal. Id. at 680
(footnote omitted). See also, e.g., Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah
24

1978) (a criminal defendant's failure to appeal his conviction to the district court
presented an "insuperable obstacle" to his later habeas corpus petition: "When he
failed to [appeal from the judgment and sentence], they should be considered to be
at rest and not subject to what would be in effect a belated appeal by the use of
habeas corpus proceeding.") (emphasis added and footnote omitted)8; Lucero v.
Kennard, 2004 UT App 94,fflf10-12, 89 P.3d 175 (a criminal defendant who
"chose not to appeal his plea or conviction to the district court for a trial de novo,"
and instead filed a petition for post-conviction relief, "[voluntarily eschew[ed] the
opportunity" to constitutionally challenge his conviction, and the district court
lacked jurisdiction and should have summarily dismissed the petition), aff'd, 2005
UT79, 125P.3d917.
Like the appellants in the foregoing cases, Mellor "voluntarily eschewed"
the remedy provided in the Liquidation Act. She chose not to file an objection to
the Second Amended NOD within the statutory time limit of sixty days. As in the
cited cases, once the sixty days passed, the Liquidator's determination became
final and "should be considered to be at rest." Mellor may not bypass the

In Webster, the Court nevertheless reviewed the judgment becaiuse the petitioner
challenged his conviction as violating "basic constitutional rights" and the writ of
habeas corpus "may be used in certain exigent circumstances/5 including where
"there has been such unfairness or failure to accord due process of law that it
would be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction.'5 587 P.2d at
530. No comparable circumstances exist here.
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Liquidation Act's mandatory procedures by challenging the Second Amended
NOD in the context of this appeal from the district court's denial of her
procedurally improper summary judgment motion. This Court should rule that the
Second Amended NOD is a final decision that Mellor may not challenge.
IV.

MELLOR'S CLAIM IS N O T A CLASS THREE CLAIM.

The overriding purpose of the Liquidation Act is to mitigate losses to
policyholders, creditors, and the public when an insurer is impaired or insolvent.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31 A-27-307(l), -307(3) (1999, repealed 2007). The Act
allocates the limited assets of an insolvent insurer among various "classes" of
claimants by establishing a priority of distribution. Id, § 31A-27-335 (2000,
repealed 2007). To effectuate the statutory purpose of avoiding or, at least,
mitigating creditors' losses, a[e]very claim in each class of claims" must be paid in
full "before the members of the next class receive any payment." Id. § 31A-27335(l)(a). Mellor's appeal tries to circumvent this rule, in order to leap-frog the
statutory classification schedule and obtain Class Three payment on what is, at
best, a Class Six claim.
The Liquidation Act assigns the highest priority to Class One and Class Two
claims, for, respectively, administrative expenses approved by the liquidator and
administrative expenses of guaranty associations. Id, § 31A-27-335(2)(a)-(b).
The next priority is assigned to policyholders, as Class Three claimants. Class
26

Four is reserved for "claims of the federal government not included in Class 3,"
i.e., taxes, assessments, and other federal claims that are not for losses under
policies. Id., § 31A-27-335(2)(d). Class Five is limited to certain debts due
employees for services performed. Id, § 31A-27-335(2)(e). Claims of "any
person, including claims of state or local governments," which do not fit into
another class, fall into Class Six. Id, § 31A-27-335(2)(f)(i)(A).9
Class Three claims are defined as "all claims under policies for losses
incurred," id, § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(l) (emphasis added), including the following:
(A) claims of the federal, state, or local government;
(B) third party claims;
(C) claims for unearned premiums; and
(D) claims of a guaranty association, other than those
included in class two, including claims for payment of
covered claims or covered obligations of the insurer.
Id, § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A)-(D). However, the same section of the Liquidation
Act expressly excludes from Class Three any claim for loss for which the claimant
has been indemnified: "That portion of any loss for which indemnification is
provided by other benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant
are [sic] not included in this class[.]" Id., § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(iii).

9

Classes Seven and Eight are not relevant to Mellor's claim.
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The policy underlying Section 31A-27-335(2)(c), which defines Class Three
claims, is to make sure that unresolved claims for benefits, on file with the
insolvent insurer at the time of liquidation, receive the highest priority in the
distribution scheme, exclusive of administrative expenses. Those current
policyholders, who have paid premiums and have an abiding expectation of
coverage, are given preference in payment over other creditors. However, if a
third party has paid the policyholder's loss claim, the insured is no longer exposed
to losses and the statutory policy of protecting policyholders before other creditors
is fulfilled - hence, the exclusion of "[tjhat portion of any loss for which
indemnification is provided by other benefits or advantages recovered or
recoverable by the claimant." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-33 5(2)(c)(iii) (2000,
repealed 2007). That exclusion furthers the Liquidation Act's basic policy of
protecting policyholders and creditors from loss, by preserving funds for the
Liquidator to distribute to other claimants - with no adverse effect on the
indemnified claimant. The policyholder's indemnitor is entitled to make a Class
Six claim against the liquidation estate, along with other general creditors.
In this case, following Mellor /, the Liquidator determined that the exclusion
for indemnified losses applies to Mellor's claim because Medicaid had paid all her
medical expenses: "The basis for the Denial is included in the attached Reply
Memorandum, the essence of which is that the Claimant has been indemnified by a
28

third party and thus has suffered no unreimbursed loss ((see 31A-27335(2)(c)(iii))." R. 5653. See also R. 5649 (Reply Memorandum: "Because
Medicaid paid Mellor's medical bills, that loss is expressly excluded from Class
Three."). In dicta, the district court agreed with that reasoning. R. 5707-5708.
Mellor makes three arguments against the Liquidator's Second Amended
NOD. Initially, she obliquely asserts that her claim is filed under her terminated
Wasatch Crest policy. She then contends that her claim is a "claim[ ] of the
federal, state, or local government" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27335(2)(c)(i)(A) (2000, repealed 2007). Finally, though she cannot contest the fact
of indemnification, she argues that Class Three's exclusion of claims for
indemnified losses does not apply here for various equitable reasons.
If the Court exercises jurisdiction and also does not rule against Mellor
based on her failure to have filed an objection to the Second Amended NOD, the
Court should reject all of Mellor's arguments on the merits of the classification of
her claim. First, the Liquidation Act clearly states that Class Three is for "claims
under policies for losses incurred," but Mellor does not have a claim under a
Wasatch Crest policy because no policy was in force as of July 31,2003, when the
liquidation took effect. Second, Mellor's claim is not a governmental claim since
only she, and not the federal Medicaid program or the Utah ORS, filed a claim and
alleges a loss incurred under a Wasatch Crest policy. Third, even if Mellor is
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Liquidation Order was entered and the Liquidator was appointed, Mellor was not
insured under her prior, but terminated, Wasatch Crest policy, and she had no legal
right to file a claim under that policy.
Mellor appears to assume that the appointment of the Liquidator somehow
revived or reinstated her terminated policy, such that she could assert a claim under
that policy years after its termination. She is mistaken. Under the Liquidation
Order, "4[a]ll rights and liabilities of WC Insurance, and its creditors,
policyholders,. . . and all other persons'5 were "fixed as of July 11, 2003 [the date
the Liquidation Petition was filed]." R. 149, ^[6. The Liquidator is required to
assess the insurer's assets and claims as of the date the Liquidation Petition was
filed, and not before that date. He is required to handle then-existing claims as of
the date of the Liquidation Order, not from the perspective of what should or
should not have been done by the company before the filing of the Liquidation
Petition. His job is not to rectify pre-liquidation decisions by Wasatch Crest.
This is not to say that Mellor could not pursue a claim against the
Liquidation Estate. She could do so because in March 2003, about five months
before entry of the Liquidation Order, she had filed civil claims against Wasatch
Crest, seeking payment of benefits under the previously terminated Wasatch Crest
policy. That lawsuit is the reason Mellor may now assert a claim against the
Liquidation Estate. But that lawsuit is an inchoate claim based on pre-liquidation
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These statements in Mellor1 s opening brief are wrong. To this day, neither
ORS nor Medicaid has filed a proof of claim, as required by the Liquidation Act,
with respect to !: *-.•• \ iedicaid bene! its paid u> Mellor, See UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 31A-27-328(l) (1999, repealed 2007) & 31A-27-329 (1985, repealed 2007).
Only Mellor has asserted a claim.
Mellor mistakenly relies on the October 3, 2002 Collection Agreement
between herself and ORS as establishing that ORS has asserted a claim against the
Liquidation Estate. See OB at 18. However, the Collection Agreement is just an
assignment agreement, in which Mellor agreed to assign to ORS any amounts she
might collect through her claim.
Significantly, the Collection Agreement identified only Wasatch Crest, and
not WCICIL, as the "Potential Liable Third Party(s)." R. 4644. Thus, it assigned
only amounts that Mellor might recover in the Fourth District Lawsuit that Mellor
would later file against Wasatch Crest, not in the proceeding against the
Liquidation Estate. As this Court held in Mellor /, under the Collection
Agreement, ORS is "an assignee of [Mellor's] rights of recovery," 2009 UT 5, \ 4,
but not a claimant itself:
The Collection Agreement does nothing more than place
a lien in favor of ORS on any reimbursement for medical
expenses that may be recovered from Wasatch Crest.
Thus, beyond its function of routing any potential
recovery, the Collection Agreement has no relevance to
the case before us.
Id., \ 10 (emphasis added).
Even if the Court were to construe the Collection Agreement as extending
beyond the Fourth District Lawsuit to Mellor's claim against the Liquidation
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L'shile, Ilk1 ajjrtviticTil eonl'iims dial Mi lloi 's, < niinsrl "'is lepiesenling the reapiem
rMellor].'"

' not ORv

:. ^ ' -•

' - t [Mclloi |; and n< I

OR^. i - 4 in i v.-niphasis aUdwu,. JLAUI if the Collection Agreement is construed
M ^ we permitted M ell or to include in Mellor's claim amounts allegedly owed to
K >!<S. and to itdvc assigned any recovered amounts from. Mellor to ORS, it cannot
pos -:\

e. ..

:s ha\ ing authorized Melloi to assert a claim h** , ti<s

o ihe

"[ORS's] direct right of recovery against any proceeds psi vable by ;in pbl'f.!,:iled
third party [,]" which they expressly "acknowledge^]." R. 4645, % 2. See also
R. 4767 (Mellor's acknowledgment that "[her] counsel has not appeared for
ORS.") • )
Mellor hues no hellci undei 'ORS's Nepleii.

.

.-.;,.. w.

••^ntatioii nf Medicaid Claim, on VVIIIN li she
starters, the Notice of Representation was filed over two ^ear^ alter th-

'^

2004, deadline for filing proofs of claims in the liquidation proceeding, as
establishes n- *v I lquidation Order F 1 ^ . 1 1 8 , 4641-4647. Moreover, the

10

This distinction is significant. Section 3 I A-27~335(2 )u:)(l) includes claims by
government agencies only to the extent they are chains, Haider policies,'" A
"direct" ORS claim for amounts it paid would not he a policy c l a i m - it would be a
Class Six creditor's claim for indemnification V..:i as discussed above, to the
extent - policyholder's claim has been indemnified, it is ulso excluded from Class

Th-v

Notice does not purport to assert a claim on behalf of ORS. It merely "allow[s] the
[unasserted] Medicaid claim to be included in [Mellor's] claim." R. 4641.
Mellor confuses the issue further when she states that her claim "included
losses incurred and claims paid by the federal and state government." OB at 15.
Section 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A) defines Class Three claims as including "claims of
the federal, state, or local government" - not "losses incurred and claims paid by
the federal and state government." "Claims of5 a governmental entity, as used in
the statute, refers to a claim made against the Liquidation Estate. "Claims paid by
the federal and state government," as used in Mellor's brief, refers to payment of
her claim for Medicaid coverage. She is mixing apples and oranges.
Mellor's statement that ORS "gave clear notice to the Liquidator of
Medicaid's interest in the Mellor claim and its right to be reimbursedf,]" OB at 15,
is also irrelevant to the issue of classification. The Liquidator disallowed Mellor's
claim based on Medicaid's indemnification of Hay den's medical expenses, not
based on his knowledge or lack of knowledge that Mellor had agreed to assign the
proceeds of her claim to ORS.
This Court must apply an unambiguous statute as written. State v. Wallace,
2006 UT 86, \ 9, 150 P.3d 540. Mellor does not suggest that Section 31A-27335(2)(c)(i)(A) is ambiguous, and it is not. Because Mellor's claim is not a claim
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mulct tin iftctlun I's ii j'OYiMiimtiilLiI eulil \ il i,s nm i < lass 1 hrcc claim mnlri Ntvlmii
31A-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A).
C.

Because Medicaid Fully Indemnified Mellor's Loss, Section 31A27-335(2)(c)(ii) Excludes the Claim From Class Three.

Even if I"1 > lei loi coi ild establish a claim i indei a W asatch Crest policy (she
cannot), the I n|iiidaloi piopeih disallowed her chum bceuuse siic i*eeei\nl lull
indemnification from Medicaid for Hay den's medical expenses

\ M I <k >h , any

such theoretical claim is subject to the exclusion for "[tjhat portion of any loss for
which indemnification is provided K ^ther benefits or advantages recowied or
recoveici^ie \:?: *<ae ciaiman

i Ah I OD\ ANN. y

i

^

-335(2)(cKiii) < 2000.

repi M«

The

. . I :.

been indemnified by a linn! part\ and thus has suffered iiu unreimbursed loss,"
R, 5653 5 was undeniably correct as a matter of fact. It is undisputed that Medicaid
paid Hayden's medical bills, in the total amount of $181 /"> 1.51. before i. ntr\ of
the Liquidatioi I Order on J iil> 31, 2003 R 51 91 -51 92 See also OB ai <>. ^ | 16,
]*» ihroiilifniiiir I n:( of Mallit aid pa\nienl .mil iiiioiiiiiil paid! Melloi \\dh lull\
indemnified by Medicaid and she owes nothing to aix> pro vider for the medical
services covered by her claim. In fact, those providers were required to accept the
Medicaid payments as payment in full for the services provided fo TTa\ eh :i , See

42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2010). Thus, Medicaid has indemnified Mellor against loss
due to medical expenses resulting from Hay den's accident.
Unable to rebut the fact of indemnification, Mellor instead advances various
equitable arguments why the Court should not apply the indemnification exclusion
as written. Her arguments individually and collectively lack merit.
1.

The Statute Prohibits Mellor's Equitable Arguments.

At the outset, the Liquidation Act precludes Mellor's equitable pleas: "A
claim by a shareholder, policyholder, or other creditor may not be permitted to
circumvent the priority classes through the use of equitable remedies." UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 31A-27-335(l)(d) (2000, repealed 2007).

The Court should reject Mellor's effort to avoid this statutory bar by
characterizing her "claims against the Liquidator" as "claims on the Wasatch Crest
insurance policy, a written contract, rather than equitable claims." OB at 16.
Setting aside Mellor's mischaracterization of her claim as arising under the
terminated Wasatch Crest policy, see supra at 30-32, her response does not change
the fact that she is seeking to "circumvent the priority classes" through equitable
arguments that the Liquidation Act prohibits.11

11

Section 31 A-27-335(l)(d) refers to "the use of equitable remedies," which
includes the equitable arguments that Mellor advances here. The obvious intent of
the statute is to preclude claimants from avoiding the statutory priority scheme
through appeals to equity. The legislature's intent can be accomplished only if the
37

2.

The Fact of Medicaid Payments Cannot Override
Unambiguous Statutory Provisions,

Mellor's primary equitable argument is thai die meemniiicaiion exclusion
should not upj il' i\ hci t\ as in (his ease, Medicaid was the indemnifying third party
Again,, Melloi dnou inol s u r e s t thai Section \ I A /"" ' 1 V5( ?)(^)(i)( A ) i'i ambi^uoir.
]Mor could she. Ihe statute clearly and unequivocally states liiai.

";. . T

losses "for which indemnification is provided by other benefits or advantages
re* i.'vered or recoverable bv die claimant aic not included in this class[.]" Its
meaning I*. • •
M'tuicL
< :r^

f

' '

u a uuun.int againsi *u ujindaiion estate lias ocen inuennuiieo
i

1

a.

-a : :

- >* r , . ^

*
•

.• .

..:.> i s excluded from
; * ive

must apply the ""unambiguous statute as written. State v. Wallace, 2006 L1* bo, € - *
150P.3d540, 1 2

phrase "equiuu..^. ^iiicj;... ... i^ao ie .mJt.d^ ;\>i.. equitable claims ano ^....u <*
arguments. Sidle ex rel ( lark v Blue ( VYASW #/MC Shield of West Virginia, inc.,
195 \\\Va. 5r 466 S.H.2d 188 ( iu*>- i is instructive. There, a claimant asserted
various reasons wh} the recei\er should accept hei untimely filed elainj Vi hough
the claimant made onh equitable arguments, not c uittahlo claims thv. \\ *s?
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in\ oked., among other pioviston.s of ;he Model
Liquidation Ad. Wi si VA CODK § 33-24-27. which h id-ntieal to UTAI; CO\W
A N N § 3 1 A - r * 3 ^ ! « d - 466 S.E. 2d at 392.
Meilor niie _ ; - iei} *•-. a,c e cuu - p»aic> statements regarding Medicaid
coverage in A/. -lo* /. .see 2009 UT 5, ^|1i 17-20, but those statements should have
no bearing in Ihis appeal, h, WAlo* L Hie t"ourt considered the purposes
underl} ing iederal and state law in revolving an ambiguity in the pre-liquidation
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Despite the clarity of the indemnification exclusion in Section 31A-27335(2)(c)(iii), Mellor argues that "this general language [in that section] is
insufficient to override the explicit reference in U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c)(l)(A)
to claims of the federal and state government for losses incurred being class three
claims." OB at 15. What Mellor describes as the "general language" in Section
31A-27-335(c)(iii) does exactly what Mellor says it is "insufficient" to do: it
provides that claims that would otherwise be Class Three claims (because they are
listed in Section 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A)-(D)) are excluded from Class Three if a
third party has indemnified the claimant for the underlying losses. And Section
31A-27-335(c)(iii) draws no distinctions based on the source of the
indemnification. So long as "indemnification is provided by other benefits or
advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant" - whoever the indemnitor
may be - the claim is excluded from Class Three.
3.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 26-19-5 and § 26-19-7 (2005) Are

Inapplicable.
As a related equitable basis for disregarding the indemnification exclusion in
this case (despite its unambiguous applicability), Mellor contends: "U.C.A. §26-

Wasatch Crest insurance plan. Here, the controlling statute is not ambiguous.
Therefore, it would be improper to decide the scope of the indemnification
exclusion based on anything other than the language of Section 31A-27335(2)(c)(iii) itself. Salt Lake Cty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, f 31, 234
P.3dll05.
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has priority over ail other claims to the proceeds . . . ' except claims for attorney
fees and costs as authorized under U.C.A. §26-19-7(2)(c)(ii)." OB at F ' r
argument misstates the record and the law
I\ lellor assumes that OR S has alien against amounts allegedly owed by the
Liquidation I^lulo umW 1 h ^\ 11C % »l >i« ANN f^o-l" M ' ^ ' H ,<l,lr,|» M"1
Liquidation Estate takes no position on that issue., which this (Y>url need nol
resolve, because that section does not purport to override the indemnification
exclusion in Section 31 -\-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A).
Scctiuu lb-l9-i>[ t K~ i)iti\m^ M* hji :
i\ii\ uianu [ui ORSj unaci ^unseenon (i){&) L°r section
26-19-5] or Section 26-19-4.5 to recover medical
assistance provided to : recipient is a lien against any
proceeds payable to oi m oehalf of the recipient by that
third party. This lien has priority over all other claims to
the proceeds, except loi attorney's fees and costs
authorized undt*r Suhseetion 26™ 19-7(2)(cj(ii).
The statute recognizes, under certain circumstances, an OR S lien on proceeds

< - n filed by llic ivcipienl in ilir li<|imlatinn proeei'diiij.', Accordingly, ml r
irrelevant to whether Mellor's claim falls under Class Three.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 26-19-7(2)(c)(ii) (2005) is also irrelevant. Mellor

asserts that th:~ nrovision and unidentified "language of the United States Code"
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require that, "as a condition of receipt of federal dollars, the Utah state Medicaid
program must maintain a program to pursue reimbursement of funds paid out by
Medicaid but for which third parties are later determined to be responsible." OB
at 16. Once again, Mellor misunderstands what the Utah statute says in multiple
ways.
First, Section 26-19-7 imposes no duty on ORS; rather, it requires a
claimant like Mellor to take a number of steps upon filing a claim against a third
party. Second, that section draws a clear distinction between ORS's right to file a
claim (which.ORS did not do here), and its alternative right to forego filing a claim
and instead to enter into a collection agreement with the claimant, to ensure that
funds recovered by the claimant are assigned to ORS (which ORS and Mellor did
here, though only with respect to funds recovered from Wasatch Crest, not the
Liquidation Estate). Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(2)(a)(i) (2005) ("if the
department has a claim or lien pursuant to Section 26-19-5...") (emphasis added),
and UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(2)(b)-(c) (2005) (providing for a collection
agreement). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(4)(a)-(c) (2005) (distinguishing
between "the recipient's claim" and "the department's [or state's] claim").
In short, Section 26-19-5 and Section 26-19-7 do not support Mellor's
equitable arguments. In fact, they do not even say what Mellor would have this
Court believe they say, and they instead further explain why the indemnification
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excli isioi i in Section 31 A 27 33 5(2)(c)(iii) applies in "this case and excludes
Mellor's claim from Class 1 hree.
4.

Exclusion of Mellor from Class Three Does Not Result in an
Impermissible Windfall.

As a (null uimtiihk1 aii'iiiiinil Mrlloi contends tin! disallonatiic of hri
c la im "a Hows Wasatch. Crest to receive a windfall due to its own bad act in
refusing to pa> a valid claim." Oii ai 1 /. Yet again, Mellor ignores the fact that
Wasatch Crest is nol a nam u* this case and has ceased *** exist as an operating
entity a? a result ofdk- Liquidation Order. The u ^ A , yww \ :O,M V-U L ... mis
:

proceeding v '
a C tS I h '
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iv. i4i* * .

In any e\ ent, the denial of Mellor's claim yielded no windfall

whether to

Wasatch Crest or the Liquidation Estate. Wasatch Crest was insolvent when
liquidation was ordered It had insufficient assets to satisfy its liabilities ' Fhe
amounts thai Hie Liquidiiloi i mm liulrcl should nol he paiul In Melloi brc.ime
a i a i lable to pa;; other claimants. Unlike a prrs a te litigant the Liquidation Estate
anc l

j t s Liq^^ator have no personal interests in retaining assets or denying payment

to lawful claimants. At the conclusion of the liquidation proceedings, all assets are
distributed to the appropriate creditors of the Liquidatiuh L stale m accordance with
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the priority scheme devised by the Utah legislature; there are no residual assets that
accrue to the benefit of the Liquidation Estate or the Liquidator.
Nor did pre-liquidation Wasatch Crest receive any windfall by terminating
the policy once Medicaid coverage began, even though this Court concluded in
Mellor /that the termination was in error. See OB at 17-18. Pre-liquidation
Wasatch Crest returned all premiums that Mellor paid for Hayden's coverage after
August 1,2001, when Medicaid coverage commenced and Wasatch Crest
erroneously believed that coverage under its plan ended. R. 4500, 4602.
Accordingly, there was no windfall because pre-liquidation Wasatch Crest
received nothing, i.e., no premiums, in exchange for its alleged liability to
Hayden's medical providers. And as a matter of equity, there was no harm to
Mellor, Hay den, or Hayden's providers because Medicaid paid for all of Hayden's
medical treatment.
D.

Mellor's Claim Is, at Best, a Class Six Claim.

The Liquidator correctly determined that Mellor's claim does not qualify for
assignment to Class Three. It also does not fall within Classes One, Two, Four,
and Five. Accordingly, at best, the claim falls within Class Six, which includes
claims of "any person, including claims of state or local governments, except those
specifically classified elsewhere in this section[.]"
335(2)(f)(i)(A).
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-27-

The Second Amended T • "'- .

>i icach the question of potential

assignment to Class Six. R. 5653. Lor reasons discussed above, this Court should
not reach that, issue either. First, the Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction. Second, even assuming jurisdiction. <nc i ,»u;*i -><- . ..

liiilrdlu lilc ,i lunch, nhjcrlioii lo llml doh'rmiiuilinii II" llie1 'onrl neuillick'Ni
addresses the merits of the Second Amended N OD, and affirms the Liquidator's
rejection of Class Three classification but concludes that Mellor may pursue a
Class Six claim, the Court should remand for the I liquidator to determine the
amount Mellor may recover.
i

t*
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:

datum I:(sta1e's M e m o r a n d u m of

* *•

t ui Authorities in Support oflts Motion LKJ x>Xk>miss Appeal, Wasatch Crest

Insurance Company in Liquidation respectfully requests the Court to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to affirm the Liquidator's
denial of Mellor s claim.
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DATED this 20th day of July, 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

John P. Harrington (#5242)
Attorneys for Appellee Wasatch Crest
Insurance Company in Liquidation
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ATTACHMENT \

4TH DISTRICT CT - AF
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS ANN WILLIAMS MELLOR vs.

WASATCH CREST MUTUAL INSURANCE

CASE NUMBER 050102878 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
CHRISTINE JOHNSON
PARTIES
Plaintiff - CHRIS ANN WILLIAMS MELLOR
Represented by: ROBERT J SCHUMACHER
Defendant -

WASATCH CREST MUTUAL INSURANCE

Defendant -

WASATCH CREST INSURANCE COMPAN

Defendant -

AMERICAN GROUP ADMINISTRATORS

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
09-23-05
09-23-05
09-23-05
09-28-05
10-07-05

Case filed
Judge DEREK P PULLAN assigned.
Note: Provo Case #030401281
Filed: Notice (Defendent in liquidation action in 3rd District)
Filed: Notice of Transfer for Randall Smart Return in Mail-Will
send to New Address
12-05-06 Order to Show Cause scheduled on February 01, 2007 at 08:30 AM
in Courtrm 1, 3rd Floor with Judge PULLAN.
12-05-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050102878 ID 9487780
Order to Show Cause.
Date: 2/1/2007
Time: 08:30 AM
Location: Courtrm 1, 3rd Floor
DEREK P PULLAN
The parties and/or counsel in this case are to appear before this
Court and show cause why this case should not be dismissed.
If you do not appear, the Court will enter an Order of Dismissal
without further hearing.
12-11-06 Filed: Returned Mail - Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance - Unable
to Forward
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CASE NUMBER 050102878 Contracts
12-11-06 Filed: Returned Mail - Wasatch Crest Insurance Company - Unable
to Forward
12-11-06 Filed: Notice
01-10-07 Note: The case was taken off of OTSC hold
02-01-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause
Judge:
DEREK P PULLAN
Clerk:
melanies
No Parties Present
Audio
Tape Number:
0711P CR1
Tape Count: 8.51.50

HEARING
TAPE: 0711P CR1
COUNT: 8.51.50
This matter was set for an Order to Show Cause on the Court's own
motion. Parties have failed to appear. A pleading from the
Plaintiff's counsel was filed stating the liquidation action of
Wasatch Crest must be addressed in the Third District
Court where the liquidation was filed. This matter is therefore
dismissed without prejudice.
02-05-07 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice
Disposition Judge is DEREK P PULLAN
03-31-07 Note: Archived Physical File CV07-09 DESTROY 8/07
09-26-07 Note: CASE HAS MET RETENTION SCHEDULE- FILE DESTROYED 9/26/2007
01-02-08 Judge DAVID MORTENSEN assigned.
06-30-09 Judge CHRISTINE JOHNSON assigned.
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